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Introduction
We study economic environments where a principal must select projects or agents from a pool, but cannot observe a candidate's ability or the project's intrinsic worth. A technique for solving this problem is to cast a wide net, and then to eliminate agents or projects that do not perform well. For example, this is how professors are hired. A department initially hires a large pool of assistant professors, gives them a few years to demonstrate their worth, and then makes an up-or-out evaluation. At the full professor stage, the survivors are evaluated again. Those who are not promoted typically leave.
There are many other selection arenas that use a similar technique. Venture capitalists may give early funding to many young start-up rms, but cut them loose ruthlessly when they fail to perform. Drug testing is similar. After the rst round of testing, many drugs are dropped, while others go on to another round.
In this paper we ask how such rounds of elimination should be structured. Should there be many rounds or only a few? How should the structure depend on cost? Should standards become tougher or more lax in later rounds? How should the selection at a later round incorporate information generated at earlier rounds?
Di erent versions of this problem call for di erent stylizations. In the stylization here, there are natural periods of time in which agents or projects generate signals. The arrival of independent signals in successive periods leads naturally to rounds of elimination. This structure arises naturally in academic life, where evaluation periods are established by policy. Hiring contests are also structured this way. It is common for a software engineering rm to test its applicants by giving them problems to solve. Candidates must pass all the rounds of elimination in order to be considered. How should the rounds of elimination and the use of the signal be structured?
To isolate the issues, we consider only two periods, with two signals (x 1 ; x 2 ) ; independently drawn from a distribution determined by an unobservable ability parameter, : The principal wants to select for high values of : He can select in a single round of elimination, waiting until the end of period 2 and using both signals, or he can select in double rounds of elimination, using x 1 to winnow the candidates at round one, and then using x 2 to winnow them further. We assume that in both schemes, he is constrained to end up with the same number of survivors.
We distinguish between selection schemes with memory and those without, as in Scotchmer (2008) . In a selection scheme with memory, the selection at round two can use the signal generated at round one as well as the signal generated at round two. In a selection scheme without memory, selection at each round can only depend on the signal generated in that round. Sports tournaments are typically selection schemes without memory, whereas promotion in the academic hierarchy typically has memory. Some of our conclusions are obvious, or at least very intuitive, once stated. However, even the \obvious" conclusions are not always true. They require conditions on the distributions, which we illuminate in this paper. We give a general characterization of optimal selection sets, but also illuminate their special structure when probability densities are log-supermodular. Our work is related to an earlier literature on optimization that uses supermodularity for the conclusion that optimal control variables move monotonically with underlying parameters (Topkis, 1978 , Milgrom and Weber, 1982 , Milgrom and Shannon, 1995 , Athey, 2002 . We use log-supermodularity to characterize optimal selection sets rather than optimal control variables.
Our main conclusions are:
Conditional on a given number of ultimate survivors, the average ability of survivors in a single round of elimination is higher than in any double round of elimination, and the average ability of survivors is higher if the selection scheme has memory than if not.
A higher cost of holding on to candidates should lead to more stringent screening at round one, less stringent screening at round two, and lower average ability among ultimate survivors.
In double rounds of elimination without memory (depending on a hazard rate condition), the selection standard should be tougher in round one than in round two.
If it is optimal to use a su cient statistic for selection in a single round of elimination, then it is optimal to use the same su cient statistic in the ultimate round of double elimination, even though the sample has been winnowed in round one, using partial information.
The last point, which follows from the factorization theorem, is perhaps the least intuitive. One might have thought that, in double rounds of elimination, extra weight should be given to x 2 at the second round. The signal x 1 was already used for selection at the rst round, and conditional on survival at round one, the signal x 1 is likely to exhibit some \good luck bias." Nevertheless, the same su cient statistic should be used at the second round as if no prior selection had taken place, although with a less stringent screening standard. No extra weight should be given to x 2 ; even if there has already been screening on x 1 :
In section 2, we describe a simple model. In section 3 we characterize how the selection set should be chosen for a single round of elimination, and record some well known features of probability distributions that lead to monotonic selection criteria. We also give examples, showing that the parameter of interest, , may be interpreted in many ways, such as the mean of a distribution, a measure of upside or downside risk, or expected waiting time for an arrival. In section 4 we discuss double rounds of elimination with memory, and in section 5 we discuss double rounds of elimination without memory.
Since we conclude that all the information should be used at every round, section 5 is mainly of interest because, contrary to this conclusion, many selection schemes ignore or de-emphasize information from earlier rounds. Our work implies that, to explain this, one must look elsewhere than simple screening. For example, moral hazard could be a justi cation. De-emphasizing earlier success maintains an incentive to work harder in later rounds. We intentionally put aside moral hazard problems, because our objective is to isolate the screening problem. Elements of our characterizations will remain when screening and moral hazard are combined.
The model
We assume that agents (or projects) are endowed with an underlying parameter , which is unobservable. The value of is therefore a random variable from the perspective of an observer. The observer wants to select a given number of agents or projects in a way that maximizes the expected value of . The underlying parameter could be, for example, the pro tability of a project, the potential market size of a new innovation, the ability of an assistant professor, the assistant professor's upside potential, or the rate at which the assistant professor thinks of good ideas. The prior distribution on is given by a density function h.
The agents (or projects) generate signals x 2 R 2 (more generally, x 2 R n ) where the draws are assumed to be independent conditional on the underlying value of : Each x i has probability distribution F ( ; ). Throughout we maintain the assumption that the distribution of signals is atomless with density f ( ; ).
This simple structure with x 2 R 2 permits two rounds of elimination. Agents or projects might be eliminated at the rst round, based on x 1 ; or at the second round, based on (x 1 ; x 2 ) : A single round of elimination means that all agents are kept in the pool until the end of the second period, and selection uses the information generated in both periods, (x 1 ; x 2 ) : Double rounds of elimination mean that some of the agents are eliminated after round one, using only the information x 1 : At the second round, selection can take place using both (x 1 ; x 2 ) or only x 2 . This is the distinction between rounds of elimination with memory and without memory.
We will use the following notation when it is convenient and not ambiguous: 1 When we write an integral sign without delimiters, we mean the integral on the full support.
Conditional probabilities will also be expressed in this notation:
We will also use su cient statistics. Using the factorization theorem, a function : R 2 ! R of the signals is su cient for if the joint density p (x 1 ; x 2 ; ) can be written as
for functions q; : R 2 ! R and : R 2 ! R.
Single Round of Elimination
We rst consider a single round of elimination, using the information generated in both periods.
In a single round of elimination, the selection set is a subset of R 2 such that only the agents or projects that generate signals (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 are chosen. Others are thrown away.
When integrated over a set of signals 2 R 2 , the total number of survivors is
and their total ability is
We pose the optimization problem with a constraint on the probability of survival (or number of survivors), S s ( ) = ; 2 (0; 1) : Reducing the set leads to fewer survivors.
Our problem is to choose the selection set such that the expected ability of survivors is maximized.
The problem we wish to solve is
Following is a general characterization of the solution.
Theorem 1 (Single round of elimination: the optimal selection set) There exists a nite number such that, for every solution to (2),
If^ and are two solutions to (2) , then
Proof: It will be convenient to state the optimization problem using a function g de ned as the expected value of ; given (x 1 ; x 2 ) : 
In appendix A,we rst show that for each , there exists a set with the property that:
2. There exists a nite number such that g on , and g on the complement.
We now show that this set is optimal. In particular, for any set A with (A) = , it must be the case that:
The rst observation is that:
These inequalities hold because g on An R 2 n , g on nA , and
Take the set A to be another solution,^ , in the expression (6) . Then the inequalities are equalities. Because g on the set^ n ; but the integrals are equal, this implies that g = almost everywhere on^ n : Similarly, g = almost everywhere on n^ : Hence, For any solution coupled with a particular , we can get the other solutions by replacing the part of where E ( jx 1 ; x 2 ) = with another set of the same measure where E ( jx 1 ; x 2 ) = : However, when (x 2 R 2 : E ( jx) = ) = 0, the optimal selection set is almost unique. By this we mean that if is a solution coupled with and and^ is also a solution, it is coupled with the same ; and either that ((^ n ) [ ( n^ )) = 0 or ( n^ )) = (^ n )) = 0. Every optimal solution is just except on a zero measure set, which is impossible to detect using integration.
When there is a su cient statistic for ; Theorem 1 can be restated using the su cient statistic. For each value 2 R, de ne
Then it is easy to show that E ( jx 1 ; x 2 ) has the same value for every signal (
Theorem 1 thus implies Corollary 1 Suppose that is a su cient statistic for : There exists a nite number such that, for every solution to (2),
If^ and are two solutions to (2), then
Single Round: Promotion thresholds and monotonicity
The characterization in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 is too general to be useful. For example, it does not say that if the signal (x 1 ;x 2 ) is larger than some signal (x 1 ; x 2 ) in the selection set, then the larger signal (x 1 ;x 2 ) should also be selected. And it does not say that if the value of the su cient statistic (x 1 ;x 2 ) is larger than a value (x 1 ; x 2 ) that would be selected, then the larger value of the su cient statistic should also be selected. These are intuitive conclusions; if they do not hold, then the signal (x 1 ; x 2 ) has no natural interpretation.
We will use the mathematical structure of supermodularity. This structure is used widely in economics, following Topkis (1978) , Milgrom and Weber (1982) , Milgrom and Shannon (1995) , and Athey (2002) . The literature is concerned with monotone comparative statics:
If an optimand is supermodular with respect to the appropriate variables, then the optimizer is a monotonic function of the underlying parameters. Our application here is concerned with optimal selection sets for random variables rather than with optimal control variables.
Monotonicity leads to the conclusion that selection sets can be characterized by threshold values.
For convenience, we state the monotonicity assumptions on the density function p:
However, they follow from the same properties of f .
The density p satis es the monotone likelihood ratio property if
Assuming that p is twice di erentiable, we will say that the density p is log supermodular (strictly log supermodular) if the cross partial derivative of log p in any of (
is nonnegative (positive). This is not the general de nition, but is equivalent to the general de nition when p is di erentiable Topkis (1978, p.310) . See the papers cited above for the de nition and underlying mathematical structure. We will also refer to log supermodularity of in (1).
We will also use rst-order stochastic dominance. Let two distributions F and G have common supports in R. We say that F rst-order stochastically dominates
for all t in the supports.
An important fact is that, if F rst order dominates G; the expected value of the random variable, or an increasing function of the random variable, is larger when distributed as F than when distributed as G: We will use a slight extension of this fact, stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let F and G be two distributions on supports contained in R such that F rstorder dominates G: Suppose that two functions u; v : R ! R have the properties that (1) both are nondecreasing and (2) u(t) v(t) for all t. Then:
The rst term is nonnegative because the integrand is nonnegative. Nonnegativity of the second term follows because F rst-order dominates G and because v is nondecreasing.
The following remark records some relationships among the de nitions that are used heavily below. The rst two bullet points re ect the fact that log-supermodularity is preserved by integration. This property underlies the analysis of Athey (2002), who extended monotone comparative statics to problems where the optimand is the expected value of a log-supermodular function.
Remark 1 Suppose that p (x 1 ; x 2 ; ) is log supermodular. Then
Any marginal density function derived from p is log supermodular. For example,
Any conditional density function derived from p, such as p (x 1 ; jx 2 ), is log supermodular.
Any conditional density function derived from p satis es the monotone likelihood ratio property.
If x 1 x 1 and x 2 x 2 ; p ( jx 1 ; x 2 ) rst-order stochastically dominates p ( jx 1 ;x 2 ).
When we assume that p is log supermodular below, we are adopting all the properties in the Remark.
We also use the following lemma, which links monotonicity properties of a su cient statistic to log supermodularity of the underlying density function.
Lemma 2 If p is strictly log supermodular and twice di erentiable, and can be written as
(1), then and can be chosen such that is strictly log supermodular and is increasing in its arguments.
Proof of Lemma:
We want to show that, as long as there is any pair of functions and such that (1) holds, then there is a pair of function and such that
@ @ log ( (x 1 ; x 2 ) ; ) > 0, as required, and
In that case, de ne~ = : Theñ is also su cient for ; and (~ ; ) is log supermodular.
The following theorem shows that, if there is a su cient statistic, the optimal selection set can be written as a threshold value on that statistic, that is, f(x 1 ; x 2 ) : (
If the selection scheme has memory, the optimal selection set cannot generally be written, for example, as f(
Theorem 2 (Single round of elimination and a su cient statistic) Suppose that p is log supermodular, and let be a selection set that solves (2) : Suppose that is a su cient statistic for : Then there exists such that
Proof : This follows from Theorem 1, and from (7). With log supermodularity, is increasing in its arguments, as is E ( j ) :
In the next section, we give some examples to show the di erent meanings that the parameter can take. The most familiar case is where is the distribution mean, and the su cient statistic is the mean of the sample. We also consider examples where is an extreme point of the support, interpreted as a measure of upside risk or downside risk.
Examples
Normal Distribution. Let x be a single random draw from a normal distribution with unknown mean and known variance v: Then the distribution of x conditional on is One can check directly that f is log supermodular. When a sample (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) is available, the joint distribution conditional on is
Using the factorization theorem, the sample mean, x; is a su cient statistic for : Applying Theorem 2, the lower bound of the optimal selection set is an a ne line with slope 1, that is = f(x 1 ; x 2 )jx 1 + x 2 g for an appropriate value of the su cient statistic, : This is shown in gure 1.
General exponential distributions. In the exponential family, the distribution of a single random draw, x, conditional on a parameter ; can be expressed as
Then, using the factorization theorem for su cient statistics, is a su cient statistic for :
Provided 0 ( ) 0 (x) > 0 (both are increasing or both are decreasing), the density function is log supermodular. The probability density of (x 1 ; x 2 ) can be written as follows:
Therefore, using the factorization theorem, is su cient for . Further, there is an unbiased estimator of ; 1 , that increases with : For this estimator,
For some number ; an upper contour set of E( jx 1 ; x 2 ), hence the selection set ; takes the following form:
Minimizing the downside risk. Now suppose x 1 and x 2 are independent and uni- are log supermodular in (x; ), and the product of nonnegative log supmodular functions is log supermodular. Therefore E( jx 1 ; x 2 ) is weakly increasing in x 1 and x 2 .
The probability density of (x 1 ; x 2 ) can be written as follows: 
For some number , an upper contour set of E( jx 1 ; x 2 ), and therefore the selection set ;
takes the following form:
Double Rounds of elimination with memory
We now suppose that it is costly to collect information in each round, for example, because assistant professors must be paid. In the previous sections, we implicitly assumed that the selection will be made only after two draws. If drawing samples is not costly, this is optimal. However, when sampling is costly, money can be saved by discarding some unpromising projects or agents after the rst round. That is, it is optimal to have double rounds of elimination. The potential penalty for saving money in this way is that the rst round of elimination might exclude good projects that would be revealed as such if kept for the second round.
We assume that the cost of experimenting is the same in each round, namely, c. This is without loss of generality, assuming it is e cient to begin the experimentation process at all. Since the cost in the rst round must be sunk in order to proceed, the (relevant) objective function depends only on the cost in the second round.
The selection process has memory if the selection criterion at round two can depend on the signal generated at round one. We view the selection problem as the choice of 1 R and 2 : 1 ! A, where A is the set of measurable subsets of R and where, for each
2 A is understood as the selection set at the second round.
The objective is to maximize the expected among agents who survive both rounds, minus the cost that must be paid in the second round for survivors of the rst round. The number of survivors at the end of the second round is constrained to be . We write the objective function as
We write the number of survivors of both rounds as
Then the objective is maximize V ( 1 ; 2 ; c) subject to S ( 1 ; 2 ) = (9)
Theorem 3 (Double elimination with memory: the optimal policy) Let 1 ; 2 be the selection sets that solve (9). Then there exists a number such that
0 for a.e. x 1 2 1 (10)
0 for a.e. x 1 6 2 1 for a.e. x 1 2 1 ;
< :
E ( jx 1 ; x 2 ) 0 for a.e. x 2 2 2 (x 1 )
Proof : In order to characterize the solution, it is convenient to reformulate the objective as a Lagrange function where the choice variables are indicator values I (x 1 ) 2 f0; 1g for each x 1 2 R and J (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 f0; 1g for each (x 1 ;x 2 ) 2 R R such that I (x 1 ) = 1 There is a one-to-one relationship between the indicator functions I; J and the selection sets 1 ; 2 ;
given by
We will sometimes refer to the optimum as the optimal indicator functions I; J and sometimes as the optimal selection sets 1 ; 2 :
The Lagrange function to be maximized is
The rst-order conditions are S ( 1 ; 2 ) = and for each (x 1 ; x 2 ) ;
To interpret these conditions, we write out the values of the partial derivatives.
Given a pair (x 1 ; ) 2 R A; we use the notation
The conclusions in the theorem follow from (12) and (13), and (16) and (17).
The condition (10) for selection at the rst round takes account of the cost that will be incurred in the second round. The value of keeping the agent after round one is diminished by the expected cost. The cost is wasted if the agent will be eliminated later. Averaged over the agents who survive both rounds, the per-agent cost of including the signal x 1 at the rst round is At the second round of elimination, the decision maker can use both sample points (x 1 ; x 2 ) to select the ultimate survivors. Since both sample points contain information, the selection process should clearly use both. However, the selection is only among agents who survived round one { many sample points are "missing," and the ones that are missing were selected in a systematic way. This means that the conditional distribution of x 2 ; given the selection in round one, is di erent than the distribution of x 1 in round one, and di erent than the distribution of x 2 if all agents were in the sample. Given that there will be a \good luck bias" among the agents who survive round one, one might think that x 2 should be given some special weight in the evaluation at round two.
To put these questions more precisely, Should the two sample points (x 1 ; x 2 ) be treated symmetrically at the end of round two?
For the case that there is a su cient statistic for a single round of elimination, should the selection at the end of round two be based on the same statistic?
Perhaps surprisingly, the following corollary answers these questions a rmatively.
Corollary 2 (Double elimination with memory and a su cient statistic ) Suppose is a su cient statistic for . Let 1 ; 2 be the selection sets that solve (9). Then for a suitable constant ;
for a.e. x 2 2 2 (x 1 )
Proof : The characterization of 1 is the same as in Theorem 3, and the characterization of 2 relies on the su cient statistic instead of (x 1 ; x 2 ) ; using (7).
Thus, if there is a su cient statistic for ; the selection criterion at the second round depends only on this statistic. It is the same su cient statistic as is used in a single round of elimination, even though the distributions are di erent. For example, if it is optimal to use only the sample mean for selection in a single round of elimination, then it is optimal to use the mean at round two { in particular, to weight the signals of the two periods equally { even when a prior selection has been made at round one, based only on x 1 : No extra weight should be given to x 2 to compensate for the fact that x 1 has already been used at round one.
As with a single round of elimination, the characterization of the optimum is more useful if the density functions are log supermodular, and therefore satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property. We now turn to this case.
Double round with memory: monotonicity and threshold values
With additional structure on the distributions, we can say more about how the signals (x 1 ; x 2 ) should be used in two rounds of elimination. In particular, the optimal selection sets ( 1 ; 2 ) are threshold policies.
Theorem 4 shows that log supermodularity again leads to the conclusion that the optimal selection policy is a threshold policy in each round. Theorem 5 re nes this result, showing that selection in the rst round should use a threshold for the rst signal, and if there is a su cient statistic, should use a threshold for the su cient statisic in the second round.
Both these threshold results use log supermodularity.
Theorem 4 (Double elimination with memory: promotion using threshold values)
Suppose the distribution p is log supermodular. Given a cost c; let 1 ; 2 be the selection sets that solve (9). Then the optimal selection sets can be written with threshold values Proof : Taking 2 rst, log supermodularity implies that E ( jx 1 ; x 2 ) is increasing in x 2 : Therefore the conclusion follows from Theorem 3.
For 1 , referring to the proof of Theorem 3, rewrite the derivative (14) of the Lagrange function as
For clarity of the argument, de ne
and write
To prove the result, we will show that
Due to log-supermodularity, E ( jx 1 ; x 2 ) is increasing with both x 1 and x 2 ; and therefore ! is increasing in x 1 and x 2 : To complete the proof, it is enough to that, if f is log supermodular and
In this notation, we want to show that
E( jx 1 ; x 2 ) is weakly increasing in both arguments by log supermodularity of p(x 1 ; x 2 ; ), and therefore v and u are weakly increasing. Becausex 1 > x 1 ; v u; and because F rst-order dominates the distribution function G (see the Remark) the result follows from Lemma 1.
When there is a su cient statistic, the optimal threshold policy can be stated with reference to the su cient statistic in round two, just as for a single round of elimination.
Theorem 5 (Double elimination with memory: su cient statistic) Suppose the distribution p is log supermodular, and that is a su cient statistic for : Given a cost c; let 1 ; 2 be the selection sets that solve (9). Then the selection sets can be written with threshold values k 1 ; such that
for a.e. x 1 2 1 ;
Proof : The characterization of 1 is the same as in Theorem 4. We must show that the characterization of 2 in Theorem 3 is equivalent to the one in this theorem. The posterior distribution of ; given (x 1 ; x 2 ), is
Using Lemma 2, E ( j ) is increasing in ; and is increasing in (x 1 ; x 2 ) : Choose so that E ( j ) = : Then the characterization of 2 above is equivalent to the characterization of 2 in Theorem 3.
Double round with memory: comparisons
As shown in Theorem 3, the expected ability of the marginal survivor in an optimal selection scheme is at the end of round two. This is also the opportunity cost of reducing the number of survivors; it is the shadow price on the constraint that a fraction of projects must survive. We now ask how the selection scheme and its e cacy change when the cost of keeping candidates in the pool increases. Given that mistakes are made at round one { some of the high-agents or projects are eliminated due to the randomness in x 1 { it is not entirely obvious how the ability of marginal survivors relates to the average ability in the group that survives.
The costliness of collecting information creates two burdens. First is the direct burden of paying the cost of round-one survivors in round two. Second, by eliminating some of the agents or projects too early, the selection process is less e ective. We show that, if the cost of keeping survivors after round one increases, fewer will be kept, and the average ability of ultimate survivors, after round two, becomes smaller.
Theorem 6 (Double eliminations with memory: Higher cost leads to more stringent screening at round one, less stringent screening at round two, and lower average ability of survivors at the end.) For each cost c; let ( c 1 ; c 2 ) be the optimal selection sets for the double-elimination problem (9). Letĉ > c: Then
The expected ability of survivors in the selection scheme ( c 1 ; c 2 ) is larger (no smaller) than in the selection scheme 
Proof : (1) Using Theorem 3, write the objective function as V , de ned as
where
it follows that
(2) The total ability of survivors is T ( c 1 ; c 2 ) for each c: If ( c 1 ; c 2 ) is optimal for c, and 
Dividing the left side by the probability of surviving both rounds, which is the same in both cases, the result follows.
(3) uses Theorem 4 and part (1) above.
The di erence can only be positive if k 1 (ĉ) k 1 (c).
Then there exists at least one value x 1 such that k 2 (x 1 ;ĉ) k 2 (x 1 ; c), because otherwise the two schemes would not have the same numbers of survivors. Becausê
at this x 1 ; it follows that^ ; and therefore (19) holds at every
Because a single round of elimination is the extreme case where c = 0 and everyone is promoted or rejected after one round, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3 (When cost is zero, a single round of elimination is optimal) Conditional on the same number of survivors, the expected ability of survivors after the optimal single round of elimination is larger than the expected ability of survivors in any double round of elimination in which some agents or projects are eliminated at round one.
Double Rounds of elimination without memory
When we say that the elimination scheme does not have memory, we mean that the selection set at round two cannot depend on x 1 : Only the fact of survival is known from the rst round. The selection problem can now be described as the choice of 1 R and 2 R, where the selection at round two requires both x 1 2 1 and x 2 2 2 :
The objective is still to maximize the expected among agents who survive both rounds, minus the cost that must be paid in the second round for survivors of the rst round. We write the objective function as
We write the number of survivors of both rounds as S ( 1 ; 2 ) =:
Then the objective is maximize V ( 1 ; 2 ; c) subject to S ( 1 ; 2 ) = (20)
Theorem 7 (Double elimination without memory: the optimal policy) Let 1 ; 2 be selection sets that solve (20). Then there exists a number such that
E ( j 1 ; x 2 ) 0 for a.e. x 2 6 2 2
Proof : In order to characterize the solution, it is again convenient to reformulate the objective as a Lagrange function where the choice variables are indicator values I (x 1 ) 2 f0; 1g for each x 1 2 R and J (x 2 ) 2 f0; 1g for each (x 1 ;x 2 ) 2 R R such that I (x 1 ) = 1: There is again a one-to-one relationship between the indicator functions I; J and the selection sets 1 ; 2 ; now given by
For each 1 R; 2 R; we use the notation
The theorem then follows from (23) and (24), and (26) and (27).
As with memory, if the probability distributions satisfy a monotonicity property, then the optimal selection sets can be expressed using threshold values, and the threshold values depend on the cost.
Theorem 8 (Double elimination without memory: promotion using threshold values)
Suppose the distribution p is log supermodular. Given a cost c; let 1 ; 2 be the selection sets that solve (20). Then the selection sets can be written with threshold values k 1 (c) ; k 2 (c)
such that
This is proved as in Theorem 4.
Finally, we can make a qualitative statement about the stringency of screening at round one. Even without log supermodularity, we can conclude that higher cost should lead to fewer survivors of round one, and that the more stringent policy reduces the average ability of ultimate survivors. With log supermodularity, the more stringent policy takes the form of a higher threshold value for survival at round one, and a corresponding lower threshold at round two, in order to ensure that there are enough ultimate survivors. 
The proof of this theorem is the same as the proof of Theorem 6 except that we must use the de nition of V in the problem (20) where the selection criterion in round two does not depend on x 1 :
Finally, we ask whether selection standards should become tougher or more lenient over time. That is, should the standard in the second round be lower or higher than in the rst round? We did not address this question for the selection scheme with memory, because the selection standards in the second round depend on the signal from the rst round.
It is convenient to return to the underlying densities f and h; instead of the density function p: Let be the hazard rate of f :
The assumption under which we can rank the thresholds in the two rounds is that the cross partial is positive: @ 2 @ @k log (k; ) > 0 (28) Lemma 3 Let k 1 ; k 2 2 R: Suppose that (28) holds. Then E ( jk 1 ; (k 2 ; 1))
Proof : Write
where g k 2 is a probability distribution de ned for each by
Similarly,
where g k 1 is a probability distribution de ned for each by
If k 1 = k 2 ; then g k 1 ( ) = g k 2 ( ) ; hence E ( jk 1 ; (k 2 ; 1)) = E ( j (k 1 ; 1) ; k 2 ) :
If the cross partial (28) is positive, the following shows that the ratio g k 1 ( ) =g k 2 ( ) is increasing if k 1 > k 2 ; and therefore g k 1 stochastically dominates g k 2 . The reverse holds if
This lemma allows us to state the following theorem: Because t is monotonic increasing, both the left limit t (a) and right limit t + (a) exist.
Moreover, t is right continuous, but may have jumps. Let t + (a) t (a) = (fg = ag) 0 be the jump at a.
Let = 1
; hence 2 (0; 1). De ne = inffa jt(a) g. Then is nite and t ( ) t + ( ) = t ( ) : The jump at is t( ) t ( ). There are two cases:
1. If there is zero jump at , choose S = fg > g. Then (S) = 1 t( ) = 1 = :
Clearly g on the complement of S:
2. If there is a positive jump at ; (fg = g = t( ) t ( ) > 0. Then 0 t ( ) t( ) t ( ). Since is atomless, there exists a subset P 1 fg = g with measure (P 1 ) = t ( ). Let P 2 = fg = gnP 1 , P + = fg > g, P = fg < g, then (P + ; P ; P 1 ; P 2 ) is a partitioning of the whole space. Choose S = P + [ P 2 . Then the complement of S is P [ P 1 , so g on the complement, and (fg < g) + (P 1 ) = t ( ) + t ( ) = .
Therefore and (S) = 1 = and g on S.
